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war was *courted* by an administration who depend upon the people for their power, and are proud of that dependence; or that it will be carried on with a childish obstinacy, when it can be terminated with honor and with safety. You have, on the contrary, a thousand pledges that the government was averse to war, and will give you peace the instant peace is in its power. You know, moreover, that the enemy will not grant it as a boon, and that it must be wrung from his necessities. It comes to this, then; whom will you select as your champions to extort it from him? upon whom will you cast the charge of achieving it against him in the lists?

Mr Wheaton's work contains other extracts from his correspondence, and some of his opinions and speeches, which, if they fail to interest the general reader, will give the work a place in the libraries of lawyers and political inquirers.

ART. VI.—*The Diplomacy of the United States; being an Account of the Foreign Relations of the Country, from the First Treaty with France, in 1778, to the Treaty of Ghent, in 1814, with Great Britain.* 8vo. pp. 379. Boston. Wells & Lilly. 1826.

THE establishment of a new empire in the western hemisphere, by the separation of the North American colonies from Great Britain, has been justly considered as constituting a new era in the political world. The events, whether political or military, which produced that extraordinary revolution, as well as those, which led to the formation of the institutions peculiar to this new republic, together with the influence, which this revolution and these institutions have had on the civilized world, are daily becoming more and more interesting objects of inquiry. No contribution, therefore, to the political or military history of this country can fail of a favorable reception from the American public. The political transactions of the United States, especially those concerning their connexions with foreign nations are much less known than those of a military character. Movements in the field, as well as their causes, are more easily ascertained and oftener become subjects of historical research, than those in the cabinet. In the latter, greater secrecy is often required,

and this secrecy sometimes continues, long after the occasion for it has ceased.

Under the old system of government, Congress held their deliberations in secret, and very little of their foreign correspondence has yet been made public. No inconsiderable part of the foreign correspondence, under the new form of government, is now before the public ; while the earlier correspondence between the United States and foreign nations still remains in the archives of the Secretary of State. In 1818, the national legislature ordered the journal of the general convention, together with the secret journal and foreign correspondence of Congress, from their first meeting, to the peace of 1783, to be published, under the direction of the President of the United States, with the exception of such parts of the foreign correspondence, as he might deem it improper to publish. By a second order, papers of a similar description, from 1783, to the commencement of the new government, were included. Under these orders, the journal of the convention, and the secret journals of Congress, have been published. The publication of the foreign correspondence has hitherto been delayed. The delicacy, as well as labor, of making a selection from such a voluminous mass of papers, may, perhaps, have been one of the causes of this delay. The publication of these important state papers, in connexion with the secret journals, would add greatly to the general stock of materials for American history, and would, no doubt, tend to increase the reputation of those American statesmen, who, during that period, were principally employed in foreign transactions. Many of them would probably be found of the same high character, with those state papers published by Congress, at the commencement of the Revolution, which Lord Chatham declared to equal any productions of the free states of antiquity.

‘The Diplomacy of the United States,’ a work which has been presented to the public during the present year, is, we believe, the first publication of the kind relating to America. It is confined to the diplomatic part of American history ; and the author has judiciously availed himself of the various state papers which have been published, not only in this country, but in Europe. From these and other sources, he has drawn up a valuable summary of this important and interesting part of the history of the United States. The account of the negotiations of this country with each of the European nations is given by

itself, in a distinct chapter. The author commences the second chapter of his work with the following remarks.

'The means of intercourse, possessed by the confederation with foreign nations, were exceedingly limited ; of the States in Europe, most able to assist them, they had known but little except as enemies. They had, in various wars, taken an active part with the mother country against France, and had powerfully, and very cheerfully, contributed to the conquest of the French possessions in North America. Indeed, one of the principal motives of the Convention at Albany, held in 1754, and consisting of commissioners from eight of the colonies, was to agree on a scheme of mutual protection against the encroachments of the French and Indians, at that time always allies. Their trade had also been constantly subject to the severities and restrictions of the colonial system ; and at the period of the Revolution was confined to Great Britain, the West Indies, Africa, and Europe, south of Cape Finisterre. It is not, therefore, to be expected that they could look abroad with much confidence or hope of relief. The principal European states possessed colonies. America labored, on that account, under the peculiar disadvantage of seeking aid and encouragement from governments, whose policy it would always be, to resist the principles the confederation asserted. Revolutions were at that time not so common as they have since become. The act of the Americans was, with the exception of two very slight affairs of the Pretender in Great Britain, the only instance of rebellion, that had occurred among civilized nations in that century. The governments of Europe appeared, moreover, at this crisis, to be strong and prosperous. Monarchy was never, in appearance, more firmly established, or colonies of all descriptions, in more complete subjection.

'It is not likely that the American colonies, in the outset, expected assistance from abroad. The Revolutionary war, though events had been setting with a silent, but most unerring course, to that extremity since '66, was little anticipated in '74, the year of the first meeting of the Delegates in Philadelphia. This war finally broke out in a very unexpected manner, and spread with a rapidity equally astonishing. It is the first illustration, we have in history, of the effects of strong excitement on a people well educated and perfectly free.' pp. 17, 18.

The colonists did not apply to foreign alliances to assist them, in their struggle against the unconstitutional and arbitrary claims of their parent country, until the last hope of reconciliation had vanished. When their second humble petition to the king had been rejected with contempt ; when, by a solemn act of Parlia-

ment, they had been thrown out of the protection of the British government, when thousands of foreign mercenaries were engaged to force them to submission ; then, and not till then, did they declare themselves independent, establish governments of their own, and seek foreign alliances.

They had, indeed, previously taken measures to sound some of the powers of Europe, on the subject of assistance, in case a separation from Great Britain should be ultimately found necessary. For this purpose a secret committee was appointed by Congress in November, 1775, consisting of Dr Franklin, Mr Harrison, Mr Johnson, Mr Dickinson, and Mr Jay. This committee were to correspond with their friends in Europe, and other parts of the world. They had their agents in Europe, among whom was Arthur Lee in London, and Mr Dumas in Holland. In March, 1776, this committee sent Silas Deane, a delegate in Congress from Connecticut, as a political and commercial agent to France, to solicit supplies of arms, ammunition, and clothing from the French court, or from whatever quarter they could be obtained. He was particularly instructed, to ascertain ‘whether, if the colonies should be forced to form themselves into an independent state, France would probably acknowledge them as such, receive their ambassadors, enter into a treaty or alliance with them, for commerce, or defence, or both ? If so, on what principal conditions ?’ The French government had anticipated that part of Mr Deane’s mission relating to supplies, before his arrival in France. This is evident from a letter written by the French minister to the king, as early as May, 1776, which the author of the work now under notice has quoted at large. It shows the extreme caution and secrecy used by the French court, in furnishing the Americans with supplies, at that early period, and is here subjoined.

‘ Sir, I have the honor of laying at the feet of your Majesty the writing, authorizing me to furnish a million of livres for the service of the English colonies. I add, also, the plan of an answer I propose to make to the Sieur Beaumarchais. I solicit your approbation to the two propositions. The answer to Mr de Beaumarchais will not be written in my hand, nor even that of either the clerks or secretaries of my office. I shall employ for that purpose my son, whose handwriting cannot be known. He is only fifteen years old, but I can answer in the most positive manner for his discretion. As it is important that this operation should not be suspected, or at least imputed to the government, I entreat

your Majesty to allow me to direct the return of the Sieur Montaudoin to Paris. The apparent pretext for that proceeding will be, to obtain from him an account of his correspondence with the Americans, though, in reality, it will be for the purpose of employing him to transmit to them such funds as your Majesty chooses to appropriate to their benefit, directing him, at the same time, to take all necessary precaution, as if, indeed, the Sieur Montaudoin made the advance on their own account. On this head, I take the liberty of requesting the orders of Majesty. Having obtained them, I shall write to the Marquis de Grimaldi, inform him in detail of our proceedings, and request his co-operation, to the same extent.' pp. 19, 20.

This is one of those curious state papers, which the French revolution has brought to light ; and to enable the reader to understand, why the answer to Beaumarchais was of so secret a nature, as to be entrusted in the handwriting of no one, but that of the son of the minister, it is necessary to state, that, previous-ly to the date of this letter, Beaumarchais had been secretly sent to London, to inform Arthur Lee, that the French court had determined to assist the Americans, by sending them, as a pre-sent, the amount of two hundred thousand *louisdors*, in arms, ammu-nitions, and money ; and to request Mr Lee to communi-cate this information to Congress, and say that the same would be transmitted through the French West India Islands, in the fictitious name of Hortales & Co. The answer here alluded to referred, no doubt, to this secret mission.

Beaumarchais soon after returned to Paris, and this million of livres was placed in his hands, for the benefit of the Americans. Soon after Mr Deane's arrival, he had several interviews with the French minister, or his secretary. The minister assured Mr Deane of his protection ; and informed him that their ports should be open to the Americans, and that every facility would be given to the shipment of warlike stores. With respect to American independence, he told Mr Deane, it would be im-proper for him to say anything on that subject, until it had actually taken place. Soon after his first conference, Beaumarchais was introduced to Mr Deane, recommended by Vergennes, and of-fered to procure for him whatever he wanted. Some doubts being suggested to Mr Deane, whether Beaumarchais, who was not a merchant or a man of business, would be able to fulfil his engagements, he had a second conference with Vergennes, who assured him, that he might rely on whatever Beaumarchais

should engage, in the commercial way of supplies. In consequence of this, an arrangement was made, by Mr Deane, with this secret agent of the French government, and military supplies and clothing were furnished, to the amount of about two hundred thousand *louisdors*, and were transmitted to America, in the name of a fictitious mercantile house, by the name of Hortales and Co. a name, which often appears, in the journals of the old Congress.

Most of the cannon and arms were, in fact, taken from the king's arsenals. This secret and mysterious mode of supply, as the author justly observes, gave rise to the claim of Beaumarchais, and rendered it very intricate.

Immediately after the declaration of independence, Congress prepared a plan of a commercial treaty, to be proposed to France and Spain; and in September, 1776, Dr Franklin, Mr Deane, and Mr Jefferson were appointed commissioners to France. Mr Jefferson having declined, Arthur Lee was chosen in his room. The manner in which the French court and nation received the American envoys, is thus described.

'Mr Lee and Mr Deane were in Europe at the time of their appointment. In December '76, Dr Franklin, the third commissioner, arrived in France. He was received with uncommon attention; known already as a philosopher, the cause he represented was undoubtedly popular in that country. Indeed, the subject of liberty itself was, already, popular. It might have been only a fashion, as so many other things have been in France; it might have arisen from the metaphysical, or rather philosophical discussions, in which the French were then so much engaged, without at all apprehending the practical effects of them. Or, perhaps, we may, with most truth, call the cause of the colonies popular, because it was one that was likely to do vast mischief to England. The novelty of the undertaking itself, produced an enthusiasm in France; a war was commenced on a new continent; the scene of action and of interest was transferred from the old world. This had, already, happened in the former French wars, when Quebec and their other possessions fell. But, then, the European had only left his customary battle grounds to meet on a new continent with the same armies, the same animosity, and the same ambition. Europe was a party to those wars. To this she was a spectator. America was viewed with that deep interest and sympathy with which the weak are regarded in all contests; and those, who were not inspired with the holy spirit of emanci-

pation, doubtless wished well to a cause, that was fought at such fearful odds.

' But the government manifested an evident reluctance to form an open alliance at this time. It naturally and prudently sought for delay. The commissioners were not publicly received ; for the fate and condition of the Americans were in an unconfirmed state ; and it might well be doubted, whether they could long resist the mother country, of whose power France, herself, had very recently had melancholy experience. But assistance continued to be secretly furnished ; privateers were allowed to equip and bring their prizes into French ports, commissions were issued by the American envoys ; and the cause of the Revolution still continued exceedingly popular with the people.' pp. 22, 23.

The negotiations of the United States with France and Spain, during the revolutionary struggle, and with Great Britain, in connexion with those powers, on the terms of peace and independence, have very properly claimed the greatest share of the author's attention ; and this part of the work will be read with peculiar interest. In maintaining the cause of independence, American statesmen, during this period, had to encounter difficulties abroad, as well as at home ; and no one can contemplate the firmness, with which these difficulties were met and overcome by them, or their perseverance, in every adverse fortune, without entertaining a greater veneration for their character.

Soon after the arrival of the American envoys at Paris, a paper, signed by the king, was read to them by the secretary of Vergennes. In this paper, his Most Christian Majesty declared, among other things, that, being determined to take no advantage of the situation, in which the United States were then placed ; he thought that it was not then a proper time to form a lasting union, which, however, he very much wished ; that they should be at liberty to make their purchases, in private, securing to him an observance of treaties, which he was determined not to be the first to break ; and that to prove his good wishes, he had ordered two millions of livres to be paid them quarterly, which should be augmented, as the state of his finances would permit. The most profound secrecy, with respect to this matter, was enjoined on the commissioners.

France evidently waited for events which should decide, beyond all doubt, not only the disposition, but the ability of the Americans to support their independence ; and to be perfectly satisfied, that her aid, when openly afforded, would prevent the

possibility of their reconciliation with Great Britain. This policy was pursued by the French court, notwithstanding the advantageous offers made by the American Congress, until the capture of General Burgoyne and his army, in October, 1777. The disasters of the campaign of 1776 induced Congress to turn their attention more seriously to the subject of obtaining foreign aid. In December of this year, they determined to send commissioners to the courts of Vienna, Spain, and Prussia, and to the Duke of Tuscany. These commissioners were particularly instructed to assure the courts, to which they were sent, that, notwithstanding the insidious suggestions of the British court, the people of the United States were not disposed to submit to the sovereignty of the British crown ; and of their determination, at all events, to maintain their independence. To induce France in particular to take an open part in the war, Congress proposed, that all the trade between the United States and the West Indies should be confined to French and American vessels, and to divide the cod fishery with France, in case Great Britain, by their joint efforts, should be excluded from any share in it. If these offers should be insufficient to produce a declaration of war, on the part of France, the commissioners were directed to yield to the king of France all the British West India islands, that might be reduced by his arms; and to stipulate, that the United States would furnish two millions of dollars in provisions, and six frigates, in the expeditions for their reduction. To Spain they offered their assistance, in obtaining possession of the town and harbor of Pensacola, on condition that the citizens of the United States should have the free navigation of the Mississippi, and the use of the harbor of Pensacola.

These new offers, however, produced no change in the policy of the two courts. The news of the surrender of Burgoyne and his army, which reached Europe about the first of December, produced a new state of things, both in Great Britain and France. The British Parliament was then in session ; but the minister was not prepared to meet so unexpected and important an event, and immediately proposed an adjournment to the twentieth of January ; which took place on the eleventh of December. In the debates on this motion, in which the ministry were attacked with great severity, Lord North declared, that one object of the adjournment was, to prepare a plan of reconciliation with the Colonies ; and he gave notice, that after the recess, he should submit to the consideration of the House cer-

tain concessions, which might serve as the basis of a treaty, and he trusted, that their endeavors would prove effectual in bringing about a permanent peace, and a lasting union between the two countries. The proceedings of parliament were soon known in France, and on the sixteenth the French king declared to the American envoys his determination to accede to their propositions. Before the completion of a treaty, Spain was to be consulted by the French court. On this subject, the king himself addressed a letter to his Catholic majesty, bearing date the eighth of January, 1778. This letter the author has very properly inserted. It distinctly discloses the policy of the two courts, as well as the real motives, which ultimately induced the king of France openly to join the Americans. pp. 297, 298.

“England, our common and inveterate enemy, has been engaged for three years in a war with her colonies. We have agreed not to take a part in it, and, considering both parties as English, we have made the commerce of our state free to whoever should find his advantage in it. In this way America has provided herself with those arms and munitions, of which she was in want. I do not speak of the aid we have given that country in money and other articles, the whole having been done in the ordinary course of commerce. England has shown some vexation at this circumstance, and we are not ignorant that she will sooner or later revenge herself. This was the situation of the business the last November. The destruction of Burgoyne and the embarrassments of Howe have changed the face of things. America is triumphant; England is cast down. But her vast marine is still entire, and having abandoned the idea of conquering the colonies, she has resolved to form an alliance with them. All parties in England are agreed in this particular. Lord North has himself announced a plan of pacification. It does not much signify to us, whether he or any other minister is in place; actuated by different motives, they will still unite against us. *It is very important to prevent the reunion of the colonies with the mother country.*”

The author has only given what he considers the substance of the conclusion of this letter. The original is more explicit as to the motives of the king, in accepting the proposals of the Americans, and is as follows.

‘This being understood, and our causes of complaint against England notorious, I have thought, after taking the advice of my council, and particularly of M. d’Ossuna, and having consulted upon the propositions, which the insurgents make, that it was just

and necessary to treat with them, *to prevent their reunion with the mother country* ; (pour empêcher leur réunion à la métropole).'

Spain, however, refused to join France in treating with the Americans. Although desirous of reducing the power of Great Britain, by the separation of her North American colonies, she was unwilling to become a party in a war for this object, without some security for the future safety of her own possessions, adjoining the newly formed American States. France, therefore, concluded a treaty of commerce, and an eventual treaty of alliance, with the United States, without the concurrence of Spain. By a secret article, however, his Catholic Majesty had a right to accede to both treaties whenever he thought proper. The connexion formed between France and America being officially announced to the British government, war was the immediate consequence.

Although Spain refused to accede to the treaties, she offered her mediation between France and Great Britain. This was readily accepted by his Most Christian Majesty, and was listened to, on the part of his Britannic Majesty, and a correspondence on the subject between the British and Spanish courts took place for several months; and was finally ended in June 1779, when Spain joined France in the contest. This was done in consequence of a convention between the two courts in April preceding, which was a secret compact, and, it is believed, has never yet been made public. It was, probably, a renewal of the old family compact, and no doubt contained a stipulation, on the part of France, to assist Spain in securing to her the exclusive navigation of the Mississippi, as well as her former possessions, east of that river. Should negotiations for peace be the consequence of the offered mediation, both France and Spain determined that the United States should be a party. To meet this event, the appointment of an American minister was deemed necessary. The instructions to the minister created much division in Congress. The members were divided on the subjects of the fisheries, the navigation of the Mississippi, and the Northwestern boundaries. They were, at first, not more unanimous in the selection of a minister. In two successive ballots the votes were equally divided between Mr Adams and Mr Jay. The subject being postponed, Mr Jay was afterward appointed minister to Spain, and Mr Adams to treat of peace.

Pending this mediation, Great Britain secretly attempted to effect a separate peace, with the United States, as well as with

France. For this purpose, Mr Hartley was sent to Paris to sound Dr Franklin, and Mr Forth to confer with Vergennes. The former, after a long correspondence, made several preliminary propositions to Dr Franklin ; one of which was, that America ‘should be released and unengaged from all treaties with foreign powers ;’ and he told Dr Franklin, that the convention formed between America and France ‘was the great stumbling-block, in the way of reconciliation.’ Mr Forth proposed to France, in case she would abandon America, that she might retain her conquests in the West Indies ; and promised not only to relinquish the right of an English commissary at Dunkirk, but to allow her great advantages in the East Indies. The offers thus separately and secretly made, were rejected by Dr Franklin and Vergennes. The negotiations of Mr Jay with the court of Madrid, were attended with peculiar difficulties and embarrassments, and required all the patience and perseverance of that distinguished patriot and statesman. Aware of the wishes of Spain to regain the possessions she had lost in America during the last war, Congress instructed Mr Jay to guaranty the Floridas to his Catholic Majesty, in case he would accede to the treaties ; and also to obtain loans and subsidies. Soon after his arrival at Madrid, Mr Jay was explicitly informed, that the king of Spain would not join in these treaties ; and that he was much displeased with his Most Christian Majesty for concluding them without his concurrence. When the American minister pressed the Spanish court on this subject, and particularly with regard to the navigation of the Mississippi, he was told, that his Catholic Majesty had determined to exclude all foreigners from entering the Gulf of Mexico from the North, and that he would enter into no treaty with the United States, until some definitive arrangement should be made relative to the navigation of the Mississippi. The embarrassments of Mr Jay were greatly increased, and his situation rendered extremely delicate, by the refusal of the Spanish court to furnish him with any money, even to pay the bills, which Congress had drawn upon him, unless upon the condition of a relinquishment of the claim of the United States to the navigation of the Mississippi. This condition the American minister refused to comply with. In consequence of the success of the enemy, at the South in 1780, Congress were induced to recede from insisting on the free navigation of the Mississippi, and a free port below latitude 31° , in case Spain would secure to the United States the navigation of that

river, above that latitude. A proposition, agreeable to these instructions, was submitted to the Spanish court, but was rejected ; and the negotiations remained in this state until June 1782, when they were transferred to Paris, and blended with the subjects of a general peace, between all the belligerents.

In 1780 the war began to affect most of the European powers. Towards the close of that year, the empress of Russia, and the emperor of Germany, offered their mediation for a general peace in Europe. This mediation was accepted at once by England, and eventually by France, Spain, and the United States. A general congress was proposed to settle the terms.

Before commencing negotiations, however, France and Spain insisted upon an explicit answer from the court of London to the question, whether an American plenipotentiary would be admitted at this congress. The king of Great Britain, in June 1781, in his answer, declared, that he would not, in any manner whatever, admit the interference of any foreign power, between him and his rebel subjects ; and, therefore, would not agree to the admission of any person, at the proposed congress, on their part ; that he would not consent to any measure, which might limit or suspend the right which every sovereign had to employ the means in his power, to put an end to a rebellion in his dominions ; and that the mediation of the imperial courts must be limited to peace between the belligerents in Europe, and not extend to a particular peace with the revolted Americans. This answer put an end to all further proceedings under this mediation. While it was pending, the instructions prepared for the American minister, under the Spanish mediation, were revised by Congress ; and at the instance of the French minister, a clause was inserted, declaring, that the American negotiators ‘were ultimately to be governed by the advice and opinion of the king of France or his minister.’ All the states did not assent to this extraordinary and humiliating clause. The states of Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, and Delaware gave their votes against it, and Pennsylvania was divided.

At the same time, Dr Franklin, Mr Jay, Mr Laurens, and Mr Jefferson were joined with Mr Adams, in the commission. The pride of Great Britain would not yet permit her to treat with her rebel subjects, as she still called them, under the mediation or interference of any foreign power.

The arms of the allies, however, were able to effect in America, what neither the imperial courts, nor the house of Bourbon,

could accomplish in Europe. The capture of Lord Cornwallis and his army, in October of the same year, convinced the British nation, that America could not be subdued by force, and led to a change of administration, and pacific overtures, on the part of the court of London.

The author has presented a view of the circumstances, which led to these overtures, as well as the negotiations which followed ; and has, also, given the reasons why the American ministers concluded a treaty, without even consulting the French court, together with a very able and satisfactory vindication of their conduct, in thus departing from their instructions. We cannot do better, than to give this vindication in the words of the author.

' This direct deviation from positive instructions, this apparent ingratitude and perfidy to a faithful and valuable ally, is susceptible of a full and ready explanation. Early in '82, it was foreseen that England was not the only country, that would present obstacles to a peace, safe and satisfactory to the United States. America, now independent, found herself compelled to resist Spain, claiming territory on the one hand, and France seeking an exclusive possession of the fisheries on the other. She had succeeded to the rights, the advantageous position, and a portion of the commerce of the mother country in the new world ; and undoubtedly France and Spain were well aware, that the United States would become dangerous neighbors on the land, and troublesome competitors on the ocean. The American colonies had always been so, even while their trade was subject to the control and prohibition of Great Britain. But France and Spain did not anticipate, that America would either claim, or be able to maintain, all the former rights of the colonies. They entered into the negotiation of '82 with the intention and expectation of extorting from England, to the injury of the United States, some portion of her territory, and a part of one of her most valuable privileges. Both those countries had a heavy balance to settle with Great Britain in the new world ; and they remembered, with bitterness and mortification, the provisions of the two treaties of Utrecht and Paris.'

' On the side of France, America had much to fear. She was disposed to curtail her fishing rights and privileges, to maintain Spain in her pretensions respecting boundaries, and to aid England in exacting a compensation for the loyalists. A letter written by M. de Marbois, secretary of the French legation, from Philadelphia, dated March 13th, '82, intercepted and decyphered at the time, if it did not give the first intimation of similar de-

signs in the French court, strengthened, at least, the suspicions before entertained. M. de Marbois advised M. de Vergennes to cause to be intimated to the American ministers, "his surprise that the Newfoundland fisheries have been included in the additional instructions. That the United States set forth pretensions therein, *without paying regard to the king's [French] rights*, and without considering the impossibility they are under of making conquests, and of keeping what belongs to Great Britain. It will be better to have it declared at an early period to the Americans, that their pretensions to the fisheries of the great Bank are not founded, and that his Majesty does not mean to support them." These extracts, taken in connexion with the obvious policy of the French court, could leave few doubts concerning its designs.'

pp. 182—185.

The boundaries, the fisheries, and the case of the loyalists, were subjects of the greatest difficulty, in the settlement of the terms of peace between Great Britain and her former colonies. On these important subjects, the American negotiators had not only to meet the British ministers, but to counteract the views and claims of France and Spain. Negotiations with Spain were resumed by Mr Jay in the summer of 1782, at Paris, with Count de Aranda. In their first conference, in the presence of Dr Franklin, the Spanish minister referred to the old topic of western limits, and asked, What are the boundaries of the United States? Mr Jay replied, that the Mississippi, from its source to latitude 31°, was their western boundary, and from latitude 31° east, by the line between Georgia and the Floridas. The Spanish minister protested against the right of the United States to extend to the Mississippi. He declared, that the western country had never belonged or claimed to belong to the ancient colonies; that previous to the war of 1755, it belonged to France, and after its cession to Great Britain, it remained a distinct part of her dominions, until, by the conquest of west Florida and certain posts on the Mississippi and Illinois, it became vested in Spain. He then drew a line, as a boundary, on Mitchell's map of North America, beginning at a lake near the confines of Georgia, and east of Flint river, to the confluence of the Kanaway with the Ohio, and thence round the western shores of lakes Erie and Huron, then round lake Michigan to Superior. This map he sent to Mr Jay, and it was, by him, soon after shown to Vergennes, in company with Dr Franklin. The latter pointed out to the French minister this line, as claim-

ed by Spain, declaring it to be an extravagant and improper one, and insisting on the right of the United States to extend to the Mississippi. Vergennes said very little in reply to these remarks ; but Mr Rayneval, his principal secretary, who was present, denied the right of the United States to extend so far west. The Spanish minister afterwards requested the American commissioners to designate some line, east of the Mississippi, to which they would assent. This, however, they refused, declaring, that they could never cede to Spain any part of the country east of that river. Mr Rayneval soon after requested an interview with Mr Jay, relative to limits with Spain. In this interview, he declared explicitly, that the United States had no claim to lands west of the Alleghany mountains, as settled by the British proclamation of October, 1763 ; that Spain had no claims beyond her late conquests, and could not, in strictness, go beyond the Natchez ; but, 'as the future might bring forth new circumstances,' he proposed an eventual arrangement of limits between the United States and Spain. He suggested, therefore, that a line should commence at the western angle of the Gulf of Mexico, which formed the section between the Floridas, and run thence to Fort Toulouse, and thence by various rivers to the Cumberland, and down that river to the Ohio. The lands north of the Ohio, Mr Rayneval did not consider as belonging to Spain, or the United States, but that 'their fate must be regulated by the court of London.'

These ideas of Rayneval were, no doubt, those of the French court, and satisfied the American envoys, that the object of France was, by the eventual arrangement of limits proposed by Rayneval, to leave that vast tract of country north of the Ohio, a subject of negotiation between Great Britain and France alone. The intercepted letter of Marbois fully explained the views of the French court as to the fisheries, and in addition to this, Rayneval hinted to Dr Franklin and Mr Jay, that they should limit their claims to the coast fishery. To Mr Adams, who joined Dr Franklin and Mr Jay at Paris, about the twentieth of October, Vergennes expressed an opinion in favor of making some compensation to the loyalists.

Under these circumstances, the American negotiators came to the resolution of proceeding without consulting the court of France. The British minister at first insisted on the Ohio as the western limits, and that the United States should have but a small share in the fisheries. In the progress of the

negotiation, however, the subject of compensation to the loyalists created the greatest, and, at one time, an almost insuperable obstacle to a favorable result. As an *ultimatum*, the American commissioners finally proposed a stipulation, that Congress should recommend to the States a restoration of their property; but they candidly told the British minister, that, on account of the public feelings in America against this class of people, the recommendation would not probably be complied with by the States. This proposition was at last accepted, and the treaty signed on the thirtieth of November.

Although the French court could not openly complain of the advantages secured to their allies by this treaty, yet the answer of Vergennes to the note of Dr Franklin, enclosing a copy of it, evinced great dissatisfaction, and was expressed in severe and bitter language.

France and Spain had not at this time settled the terms of peace with Great Britain. Serious difficulties had arisen to prevent this; and among these, the claim of Spain for the surrender of Gibraltar was not the least. Having failed to obtain this fortress by force, Spain was determined to have it by negotiation; and her minister was instructed not to make peace without it. The aid of France was particularly solicited, and the Spanish court offered to France her part of St Domingo for Gibraltar. Mr Rayneval was intrusted with this important negotiation at London. A majority of the British cabinet, after much debate, agreed to yield up Gibraltar to Spain, on two conditions; first, The restitution of all the conquests made by Spain, namely, Minorca, West Florida, and the Bahama Islands; secondly, The cession of Porto Rico, or the restitution of Dominique, and the cession of Guadalupe, by France. The French king was willing to restore Dominique, to cede Guadalupe, and take the Spanish part of St Domingo; but the king of Spain hesitated about restoring West Florida. The king of England, however, at last put an end to this negotiation, by an absolute refusal to give up Gibraltar on any terms. With respect to territory, the *ultimatum* of the British cabinet was, the cession of both the Floridas, together with Minorca, and to receive back the Bahamas. This was finally accepted by the Spanish minister, though contrary to his instructions.

The advantages secured to the United States by the treaty of peace, were probably greater than those obtained by France or Spain. For these they were indebted to the abilities and

firmness of their ministers. It was foreseen by the American negotiators, that great difficulties would arise in the final adjustment of so many claims as must occur between Great Britain and the powers confederated against her, and that even among the confederates themselves there might be interfering interests. France, Spain, and Holland had important interests to settle, not only in America, but in Europe, the East and West Indies, and, indeed, in every part of the world ; and each would naturally endeavor to obtain the most advantageous terms for itself.

Soon after the treaty of peace, new subjects of dispute arose between the United States and Great Britain, and also between them and Spain ; the origin and nature of which are accurately stated in the work before us. While negotiations relative to these disputes were pending, a most extraordinary revolution took place in France ; a revolution, which produced new and more important causes of complaint on the part of the United States against England and Spain ; and involved this country in new and almost inextricable difficulties with France. The length to which this article has been extended, must prevent us from tracing the author through the intricate and protracted negotiations in which this country was involved with foreign nations, in consequence of this unexampled state of things in Europe. We must content ourselves with referring to the work itself. The author has stated them with accuracy and fidelity ; and the remarks with which he has accompanied this statement, are made with impartiality and candor.

These negotiations embraced important questions of national law, relating to neutral rights, deeply affecting the commercial interests of the United States. During this mighty conflict, which continued without much interruption for a quarter of a century, the United States received great injuries from Great Britain and France. While the former was determined that the Americans should not directly or indirectly afford assistance to her ancient rival, the rulers of France, by whatever name they were called, were resolved, that the United States should join in the war against England. Each accused the American government of partiality to her rival ; and it required all the wisdom and prudence of President Washington to prevent the United States from being at an early period involved in the war, which so long desolated Europe.

The first minister from the French republic, in 1793, was

instructed to form a family compact with the Americans, and to induce them to make common cause with France ; and in 1807, the imperial Bonaparte, when solicited to relax his celebrated decrees, in favor of the United States, not only refused, but declared, that the Americans should be compelled to take the position and character either of allies or enemies. This declaration was made, when, in the height of his conquests, Bonaparte determined that the United States should unite in enforcing his continental system. The origin and object of this celebrated system, and its effects on the commerce of the United States, are explained in this work ; and the power and views of Bonaparte, at this period of his career, are well described.

' The mind is impressed with a singular sensation, in beholding a great conqueror, just reposing from one of his most signal victories, in the capital of the sovereign, whose army he had rather destroyed than defeated, issuing decrees, that embraced, in their desolating effects, almost every sea of the civilized world. The power of Napoleon Bonaparte was scarcely bounded by any river on the continent of Europe. In gaining his great victories, in adding state after state to his dominions, in placing brother after brother upon the thrones of the old nations, whose dynasties he had thrown down, he seems to have been fulfilling his proper part,—to have been accomplishing the destinies of which, under Heaven, he was the humble instrument. Wherever he marched, he carried a force with him sufficient to effect his purposes. This was the legitimate exercise of the vast power, with which he was intrusted, by Providence, for objects which it is not yet altogether in the reach of man to comprehend. But when he extended his ambition to the ocean ; when he undertook to overwhelm whole countries, by maritime decrees, we perceive that he has left the orbit, in which it was his destiny to move ; and we feel, that the unity of his theatrical character is destroyed. pp. 120, 121.

France was powerful by land, England by sea ; and in their unexampled struggle for preeminence, particularly on the ocean, both were guilty of unparalleled violations of maritime rights, and both vindicated their proceedings on the principles of retaliation. That the United States, for these violations of their rights, had legitimate causes of war against both, there can be little doubt ; and the only question was, whether, in the peculiar state of the world, it was wise, politic, or necessary for them to select either for their enemy. The various measures, which at last induced the United States to make a selection, together with the negotiations, which ended in the treaty of Ghent, are

stated by the author with his usual ability and fairness, and this statement concludes the volume.

This work evinces throughout much industry and research, and will be found a valuable addition to American history. It may be perused with special profit by those, who would be instructed in that portion of the history of the country, relating to its intercourse and connexions with foreign powers.

- ART. VII.—1.** *Supplement to the American Ornithology of Alexander Wilson; containing a Sketch of the Author's Life, with a Selection from his Letters; some Remarks on his Writings; and a History of those Birds, which were intended to compose Part of his Ninth Volume. Illustrated with Plates, engraved from Wilson's Original Drawings.* By GEORGE ORD. Philadelphia. 1825. J. Laval and S. F. Bradford.
- 2.** *American Ornithology; or the Natural History of Birds, inhabiting the United States, not given by Wilson; with Figures drawn, engraved, and colored, from Nature.* By CHARLES LUCIAN BONAPARTE. Vol. I. Philadelphia. 1825. S. A. Mitchell, Publisher; W. Brown, Printer.

WHEN we compare the present state of the world with what is called antiquity, there is nothing in which the superiority of the later ages appears more conspicuous, than in the advancement of the natural sciences, or discoveries of the laws, operations, and characteristics of the physical creation. Lord Bacon has told us, that the common way of talking about antiquity is erroneous, and that men have begun to reckon at the wrong end. The old age of the world, he says, is the proper period to be thus denominated, and not the green years of youth and inexperience. We of the present day are in fact the true ancients, and Zoroaster, Pythagoras, Plato, Aristotle, and others, whose lot it was to come upon the stage in the opening scene of the drama of human existence, are in reality the younger brethren of the great family of mankind. They had the imagination, the fire, and the inquisitiveness of youth, the power of genius and the resources of intellect, but, without the light of